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Abstract 
dŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ'ĞƌƚŝĞƐƚĂ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children conference in Madrid, 2017: the notion of 
grown-upness and how this might be problematic in practising Philosophy with Children.  
ŝĞƐƚĂ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŶ-upness seems to imply a deficit view of children, despite his suggestion that 
the concept is not a developmental one.  It is proposed here that the idea of grown-upness 
demands that children are positioned by others  W adult others  W which further denies their 
agency and fails to allow that they may be active in the world they inhabit ?ŝĞƐƚĂ ?Ɛ
suggestion that grown-upness is about  ?a way of being in the world ? is discussed in relation 
to how Philosophy with Children positively encourages participants to engage with others by 
attending to a range of views and perspectives without situating themselves at the centre.  
What is proposed is that the very practice of Philosophy with Children enables participants 
to engage with questions of interest to themselves and others in a community of 
philosophical inquiry.  Community is seen as crucial in supporting individuals to recognise 
the world and those other than themselves in living and thinking together.  This, it is 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ?ŝƐĂďŽƵƚůŝǀŝŶŐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůůǇƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐ ?ŐƌŽǁŶ-ƵƉ ? ?The article 
concludes that emphasis on the philosophical element of the practice rather than on the 
children who engage in it may address the deficit view of children/child thrown-up by 
ŝĞƐƚĂ ?/ŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ?ĂŐĞŽĨŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ĂƐŝĞƐƚĂĐĂůůƐŝƚ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
with Children might tackle this, it may be more helpful to talk about practical philosophy or 
community of philosophical inquiry, where child/adult status is not the focus. 
Keywords: Philosophy with Children; child; grown-upness; practical philosophy; community 
of philosophical inquiry 
 
 
2 
 
[Type here] 
 
Grown-upness; a word used by Biesta to describe the manner of being in which we ought to 
exist in the world.  Grown-upness is not, according to Biesta, about a developmental 
trajectory so beloved by developmental psychologists.  In this he is, arguably, in error.  
Grown-upness is directional ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶŝƚƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ?ƵƉ ?; by definition, it 
demands some kind of trajectory since nothing is born or begotten grown-up.  Grown-
upness is a noun that explains a particular state, deriving from the term, grown-up, and the 
associated verb to grow up.  In order to be considered grown-up something has to grow up 
and subsequently it might attain grown-upness.  We cannot simply  ?ƌĞĐůĂŝŵ ?ŐƌŽǁŶ-upness, 
as Biesta suggests, because a process must be gone through in order to acquire such status 
as being grown-up.  That process is necessarily developmental in one way or another and it 
is the goal to which the growing thing aims.  It is unhelpful of Biesta to acknowledge that his 
use of the word grown-upness is atypical; it is somewhat removed from the common 
understanding or usage of being grown-up that it means the word cannot, as he 
recommends, be reclaimed.  Biesta, instead, in using it in this fashion, seems to be 
appropriating the term rather than reclaiming it, since the context  W Education  W from which 
he chooses to reclaim it, would not employ it in the alternative manner presented by Biesta.  
He needs to acknowledge all that is bound-up with such a notion.  The aspiration to grown-
upness leads to another issue with Biesta, that children ought to aspire to grown-upness, an 
end point impliĞĚďǇŝĞƐƚĂ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ. 
When talking about children and being grown-up or exhibiting grown-upness, it presumes 
that the end point is desirable.  The end point for children is, inevitably, adulthood.  While 
Biesta, in his lecture, professes that grown-upness was available to children as well as to 
adults, he continues to speak within the child/adult binary that ensures the grown-up adult 
is the destination to be arrived at.  It is worth acknowledging that not all adults, 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ ?ŐƌŽǁŶ-ƵƉƐ ? ?ĂĐƚŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚŝĞƐƚĂŵŝŐŚƚĂƐƐĞƌƚĂƌĞ
the qualities required of grown-upness.  That aside, however, the view of the child as deficit 
in some way, has predominated in common discourse and educational thinking, and the 
proposition that grown-ƵƉŶĞƐƐĂƐ ?ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞǁŚĞƌĞĞŐŽŝƐnot put at the 
ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ĂƐƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ reconfirms this.  Indeed, the power to name individuals or 
groups as grown-up or of demonstrating grown-upness is retained by adults.  Even were 
children to be considered grown-up, it would not likely be that they would ascribe 
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themselves with such an appellation.  Much has been written about the place of children in 
society and that they are often not seen as full members of that society (Friquenon, 1997; 
Qvortrup, 2006, 2007; Mayall, 2007; Cassidy, 2007).  Indeed, children often collude with this 
view in their descriptions of the society in which they live (Conrad, Cassidy & Mathis, 2015), 
seeing themselves as set apart, as devoid of the power ascribed to adults.  This is because 
children tend to be seen as deficient in the ways and means of being.  They are irrational, 
impetuous, illogical, emotional, uncontrolled and are unable to reason, articulate and think 
well.  They are, also, ego-centric.  This is in direct opposition to those who are adults, or are 
grown-up.  Adults  W grown-ups  W are competent; they can reason, argue, control themselves 
and their emotions and are reasonable.  They are, also, able to avoid ego-centrism.  The 
child is often described in negative terms, in ways that are used to illustrate how they lack 
the capacities and capabilities of their adult counterparts (Cassidy, 2007).  Thus, childhood is 
the time when growing-up takes place. 
Becoming grown-up 
Stables (2008) outlines three ways of defining the child.  The first is that we are all children, 
having all been born of parents.  The second is that we might define it by age such as in the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (United Nations, 1989), under 
Article 1, where children are considered to be under eighteen years-old, unless majority in 
their country is attained earlier.  Leaving aside the many problems with the UNCRC 
definition, Stables offers a third: the child as becoming.  This third definition is the dominant 
view of the child, one that sees ĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚĂƐ ?ĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ƚĂďůĞƐ ?
2008, p.4), where the child is socialised and trained into the kind of individual the particular 
society in which she lives sees fit (Shamgar-Handelman, 1994).  The being to which the child 
strives is always there within her.  The unfinished child, as such the becoming child must be, 
has potential to which she is directed.  She will always become an adult in the same way 
that an acorn will become an oak tree or a foal a horse; the child is destined to grow-up, 
under such a view, to become an adult.  Kennedy (1992, 2006), in exploring child as 
becoming, also suggests that the child is considered to be raw material, that the adult is 
always travelling with the child until the potential is reached; that potential, is adulthood.  
On reaching adulthood one is grown-up.  Part of the problem in proposing that grown-
upness is a desirable state for individuals to attain is that the individuals who determine this 
4 
 
[Type here] 
 
view are, invariably, adults; adults determine who has power and how it is employed.  So, 
while Biesta makes clear that under his definition of grown-upness that both adults and 
children can be grown-up, he fails to acknowledge that it is adults who hold the power to do 
the naming.  Further, it is adƵůƚƐǁŚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝĞƐƚĂ ?Ɛ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ?ŽĨ ?ďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚǁŚĞƌĞǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƉƵƚŽƵƌĞŐŽŝŶƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ?dŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶ perpetuates the idea that 
those who have not acquired grown-upness  W children  W position their egos at the centre of 
their being.  This is recognised by the likes of Cook (2015) who asserts that  ?ŚŝůĚƌĞŶĐĂŶ
ŶĞǀĞƌƐŝŵƉůǇƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŝŶƚŚĞŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŶŽǁ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞĂƌƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŝƌ
ďŽĚŝĞƐĂŶĚĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞŝƌƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚƐĂƌĞĚĞƚĞrmined by 
adults, and this, it seems, includes whether or not they exhibit grown-upness.   
Children as subjects 
In acknowledging that adults retain the power in society Qvortup (2006) urges that we 
ŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĐĂƵƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂĚƵůƚŚŽŽĚŝƐŶŽƚƐĞĞŶĂƐ ?ŵore signiĨŝĐĂŶƚƚŚĂŶĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚ ?
(p.435).  dŚŝƐŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĨǁĞĂƌĞƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚŝĞƐƚĂ ?ƐĞǆŚŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ?ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂƐ
ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? ?^ƵďũĞĐƚŚĂƐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďƵƚŝĨǁĞĂƌĞƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚĂƐƐƵďũĞĐƚ
of the world, then it sets her apart.  If the world is seen as the local society of which one is a 
part, then this is governed by adults, so the child becomes subject of the adult world, or 
subjected to the adult world.  If, however, the world is greater than the local, and more than 
the adult sum of that world, then the child as subject of that world may be further 
empowered.  In so saying, though, a subject owes a certain allegiance to the realm in which 
she belongs and is governed by that world.  Perhaps the child is no different from the adult 
under such an understanding since there ought to be care for the world in which and with 
which one lives.  The truly global takes precedence over the individual and positions the ego 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐ ?dŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĨŝŶĞǁĞƌĞŝƚŶŽƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ ?
as noted previously, the child is not afforded much autonomy or status in the decision-
making element of being in the world.  The notion of existing in the world as subject is not 
unproblematic.  Biesta wonders how the world of Philosophy with Children (PwC) positions 
children in the world.  In  ?positioning ? children, he again situates children in a context that 
fails to recognise them as agentic or autonomous.  They do not position themselves but are, 
rather, situated by some other  W usually an adult other. 
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dŚĞ ?/ ?ŝŶWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁŝƚŚŚŝldren 
/ŶŚŝƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŝĞƐƚĂƐƉĞĂŬƐĂďŽƵƚĂƌŽďŽƚŝĐǀĂĐƵƵŵĐůĞĂŶĞƌ ? ?ĂŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ?ĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ĂƐŚĞĐĂůůƐŝƚ ?He sees a problem, that the intelligent, adaptive system, while able to 
adjust and adapt to its environment, is not able to ask of the environment in which it is put 
if it is an environment worth adapting to.  The vacuum cleaner is programmed; it works to 
survive rather than to live and it sees objects in its path as obstacles to be overcome.  He is 
correct that we do not want children to be seen as robotic vacuum cleaners, and there is 
much in what is done in the name of schooling that perpetuates such a view.  Biesta talks 
about the dangers of twenty-ĨŝƌƐƚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇƐŬŝůůƐĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚĞǀĂĐƵƵŵĐůĞĂŶĞƌ ?Ɛ
 ?ƐŬŝůůƐ ?, are focused on survival rather than living, a notion much richer in scope than the 
former would imply.  The intelligent, adaptive system sees only the other as a hurdle to be 
countered; people  W children and adults  W have the capacity to recognise the other as 
someone or something to be encountered.  While they may recognise obstacles, it is an 
important element ŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛbeing that one welcomes encounters with the world and those 
who inhabit it.  Indeed, Biesta speaks in his lecture of Levinas ?ŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨďĞŝŶŐ
awakened by the other.  He also talks about resistance and the need to stay in the middle-
ground where we destroy neither the world nor ourselves.  It is an awakening of self that is 
possible when one seeks encounters with others and that some of these encounters 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ?ŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚǁĂǇƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ?tŚŝůĞ
the automatic vacuum cleaner may be adaptive to its environment, this is not desirable for 
those of us living in the world. 
To live, rather than to survive, in the world one has the facility to move beyond the 
adaptive; one can shape and determine the environment.  In order to do so, one must 
engage with the world and the others within it.  One must encounter others and face 
resistance.  At the same time, one must also offer resistance.  If resistance is not addressed 
ŽƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚǁĞŚĂǀĞ ?ĂƐŽŶĞŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨŝĞƐƚĂ ?ƐĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ?Ă ?ĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚĐŚŝůĚ ? ?
Biesta sees compromise in positive terms, where it situates the individual in the middle-
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞŽŶĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďƵƚĂƌĞŐŝǀĞŶĂ ?ƌĞĂůŝƚǇĐŚĞĐŬ ? ?dŚĞ
danger is that the compromised child is a child that perpetuates the status quo, that she 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐŚĞƌƉůĂĐĞŝŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ?ŐƌŽǁŶ-ƵƉ ?ĂĚƵůƚ and that she does not have 
opportunities to question, to challenge, to encounter and to wonder  ?if the desires she has 
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are the desires she ought to have ? ?ĂƐŝĞƐƚĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ.  Indeed, the compromised child, the 
child who remains situated as a non-grown-up will not be inclined to address the distinction 
between surviving and living, she will be too busy adapting to their environment.  dŚĞ ?/ ?ŽĨ
the compromised child is suppressed rather than there being a repositioning of the self in 
relation to others in order to advance living well. 
Living philosophically 
KŶĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŽĂ ?ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞůŝĨĞ ? ?ĂƐŝĞƐƚĂĐĂůůƐŝƚ ?ŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ?
ŝĞƐƚĂƌĂŝƐĞƐƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁŝƚŚŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Wǁ ?ďĞŝŶŐƚŽŽ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŚĞĂĚ ? ?ďƵƚ
through dialogue with others this need not be the case.  By necessity PwC demands an 
encounter with others where, through structured dialogue, participants face resistance to 
their ideas and offer resistance to others.  This does not mean that individual participants 
stick trenchantly to their positions, the activity demands listening and consideration of what 
is articulated.  Socrates tells us ƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚŝƐĞǀĞŶŚĂƉƉĞŶƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŐŽŽĚĨŽƌĂŚƵŵĂŶ
being  W to construct arguments every day about virtue and the other things about which you 
ŚĞĂƌŵĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐďŽƚŚŵǇƐĞůĨĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?Apology , 38a).  Conversing, 
dialogue, is central to this way of living, of being in the world and, arguably, to being; as 
^ŚĂƌƉ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ? ?It is through speaking to other persons that one becomes a person 
ŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
PwC is different from formal, academic philosophy, the philosophy taught and studied in 
universities.  In PwC participants engage in a structured dialogue with others about their 
ideas (Gazzard, 1996; Murris, 2000).  Derived from Dewey, the idea of shared meaning-
making is a key element of PwC (Lipman, 2003). The notion of community is significant.  
Indeed, in the literature relating to PwC terms such as community of inquiry, community of 
philosophical inquiry and philosophical community of inquiry are common (see, for 
example: Lipman, 2003; Pardales & Girod, 2006; McCall, 2009; Millett & Tapper, 2011).  
Community is more than a group of individuals; it requires independence and co-operation 
(Cassidy, 2007).  This is impŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŝĞƐƚĂ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ?/ ?ŽƌĞŐŽŝƐ
not put at the centre of our being in and of the world.  While the self may be awakened 
through dialogue with others, the individual in the dialogic community is diminished, at least 
during the dialogue.  Bearing in mind that whichever approach taken to PwC  W and there are 
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several  W they are practices, undertaken over time.  Over the course of participation, the 
dialogue itself becomes more important to the participants than the presentation of their 
own particular perspectives or the need to preserve those perspectives without movement 
or flexibility (Sharp, 1987; McCall, 2009).  Participants raise questions that are of interest to 
themselves and the community, and they engage with one another to reach understanding, 
though not necessarily agreement, about the questions addressed (Cassidy, 2016).  Their 
loyalty is to the shared search for meaning rather than to the pursuit of their own argument 
ĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? arguments.  The ego, in PwC, is not at the centre; the community 
and the dialogue take precedence.  This, of course, is not to say that the individual as 
individual is not important.  Should the focus remain on only the community then the 
ĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚWǁŝƐƚŽŽŵƵĐŚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŚĞĂĚ ?ŵŝŐŚƚďĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?/ƚŝƐŚŽƉĞĚƚŚĂƚ
engagement in philosophical dialogue will have a bearing on how one engages in and with 
the world  ?>ŝƉŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?DŝůůĞƚƚ ?dĂƉƉĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŶŽŶĞ ?Ɛbeing in the world. 
Thinking together and ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƚŚŝnking is necessary if there is to be any impact 
ŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƵƌǀŝǀĂů ?'ĂǌǌĂƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůůǇ
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞĂŶĚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞĂŶĚǁĂǇŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ?ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚ
not be a discrete activity.  This is echoed by the likes of Schertz (2007) who proposes that in 
engaging with philosophical dialogue, the affective domain is as enhanced as the cognitive 
ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ ?ŝƐĂǀŽŝĚĞĚ ?  He takes this further to suggest that in teaching 
children to be empathetic the teacher is not reinforcing the social order; ŚĞƐĞĞƐŝƚĂƐ ?a 
form of social liberation for the express purpose of sharing feeling states to foster personal 
and societal ŐƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĞŵƉĂƚŚǇŝƐĂ ?Ɖ ǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝǀĞůŝŶŬĨŽƌŵŽƌĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŵŽƌĂů
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƵŶĚĞƌŝĞƐƚĂ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽďĞǀŝƚĂůŝĨƚŚĞĞŐŽŝƐƚŽďĞ
removed from the centre.  Like Schertz (2007), Cassidy (2016) recognises the potential link 
between PwC, reflective thinking, and the lived experience when she states ƚŚĂƚ ?dŚĞ
ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵŽŶĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞ
ŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ?513).  In this she acknowledges the place of children as members of society, as 
participants in the world who act in that world.  She goes on to propose a deliberative 
society for all, that requires the checking and rechecking of ideas.  The dialogic space 
ŶĞĞĚĞĚĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĂƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝƐŶŽƚůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞ ?ŐƌŽǁŶ-ƵƉ ? ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů
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encounters such as those proposed should be open to all.  In so saying, Cassidy agrees with 
sĞƵŐĞůĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂƌĞŶĞĞĚĞĚ ?ƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĂǁĂƌĞĂŶĚĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵs [and 
ƚŚĂƚ ? ?ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇŵƵƐƚďĞǁŽŶƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ? Ɖ ?110).   
Conclusion 
/ƚŝƐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ǀŽŝĐĞ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĂƚŝĞƐƚĂŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝĨ
he is to advocate that the ego be removed from the centre, that grown-upness, to use his 
definition, is attainable by all.  His existential strategy can only fail to succeed in recovering 
children and their associated childhood if issues pertaining to their status in the world 
remain unaddressed.  Without due consideration of these issues, children will always be 
seen as deficient, in a state of becoming, being positioned by adults and who are then not 
permitted to engage in advancing the world in which they live.  There is not space here to 
explore the links between PwC, rights and education for citizenship, but this may be where, 
as Cassidy (2016) proposes, the answer lies in advancing the notion of deliberative 
participation, where children may be inducted into living in the world in a way that does not 
put ego at the centre.  Sharp (1987), too, proposes that children should have the 
opportunity to participate in dialogue, in a community of inquiry, from the earliest age, a 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĂƚƐŝƚƵĂƚĞƐŝƚƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂƐ ?ĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ-in-ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?.  This 
is not to position children as deficient, though they may be less practised in their 
deliberations and will have had fewer opportunities to engage with the world of which they 
are a part than older members of society.  Perhaps in speaking about Philosophy with 
Children a problem is presented that continues to see children, despite empirical evidence 
to the contrary (see, for example: García-Moriyón, Rebollo & Colom, 2005; Daniel, 2008; 
Cassidy & Christie, 2014; Gorard, Siddiqui & Huat See, 2015), as less than adept in their 
thinking, their reasoning and their will to engage with others and the wider world.  In 
continuing to speak of Philosophy with Children, emphasis is placed on the condition and 
status of children.  The focus of the practice itself ought to be on the philosophical.  Perhaps 
this may be achieved if the movement that engages children in philosophical dialogue would 
consider a shift to describing what they do as practical philosophy, philosophical inquiry or a 
community of philosophical inquiry rather than Philosophy with Children.  This, it is 
proposed, would allow a move away from suggestions of grown-upness as being the desired 
way of being, towards a way of being in the world that is deliberative and that does not see 
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deliberation and its associated action as the preserve of any one group in that world, 
notably adults.   
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